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STATE LAND USE LAWS AND REGIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
By George D. Brown* 
INTRODUCTION 
State governments have increasingly assumed a major role in a 
matter which had been largely the province of local jurisdictions: 
controlling the use of land. This phenomenon-frequently referred 
to as "The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control"l-shows continu-
ing signs of vitality throughout the country as special study commit-
tees issue their reports and state legislatures debate the enactment 
of land use statutes.2 This article focuses upon Massachusetts-a 
state likely to join the ranks of the Quiet Revolution within the next 
two years3-and upon the intergovernmental issues which have ari-
sen in t4e course of the land use debate within that state. 
In Massachusetts, interest in new land use control systems has 
converged with the movement toward new institutions at the re-
gional level. The state's Regional Planning Agencies have gained 
significant new functions in recent years,4 and some of these agen-
cies are likely to evolve into general purpose regional governments. 
Enactment of new land use legislation can hasten the development 
of regional institutions, if such legislation assigns significant respon-
sibilities to the regional level of government. At the'same time, the 
potential ability of regional institutions to play a major role in a 
non-localized land use system is a factor in deciding whether to set 
up such a system. 
This article advances three general propositions for consideration 
by the participants in the Massachusetts debate: 5 
First, legislation should allocate significant responsibility to re-
gional (sub-state) entities, but should retain a substantial local role. 
Development decisions should be made by local governments in the 
first instance, with higher (state and regional) levels participating 
in those decisions, or hearing appeals from them, or both. 
Second, existing regional institutions are incapable of performing 
most of the functions which such a system should allocate to the 
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regional level. New regional institutions must be developed, with 
particular emphasis on the need for visibility and political account-
ability, and consistent with the requirements of the one person-one 
vote doctrine; 
Third, statewide land use legislation need not be uniform in struc-
ture or operation across the state. 
These propositions are advanced in the context of the Massachu-
setts debate. However, they may be of interest to policy-makers in 
other states as well, for the debate over new land use laws is emerg-
ing as one of the most significant inter-governmental issues in the 
history of our federal system.6 
I. ALLOCATION OF FUNCTIONS AMONG LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT 
A. The American Law Institute Regulatory Categories. 
Because any new land use system adopted in Massachusetts is 
likely to be based on the regulatory concepts of the American Law 
Institute's Model Land Development Code,7 a brief description of 
these concepts is necessary at this point. While much of the Model 
Code is devoted to strengthening the regulatory and planning capa-
bili ties of local government, 8 the premise of Articles Seven and 
Eight is that there are certain land use decisions which cannot be 
entrusted to an exclusively local system of regulation. These deci-
sions (estimated at approximately ten percent of all land use regula-
tory decisions') affect interests other than local, which the local 
political and governmental processes cannot be relied on to pro-
tect. 10 Thus, local land use control is perceived as a function which 
can create significant "externalities"; in other words, the "costs" 
and "benefits" are not fairly distributed among all those who should 
share in them. 11 
The Code attempts to delineate the limited categories of land use 
decisions in which supra-local interests are present. For t.hese 
categories the Code then establishes a non-local system of regula-
tion. This step is a frequent response to problems of externalities: 
transfer of the function to a higher level of government. 12 At the 
same time, the Code preserves local control over the large majority 
of land use decisions, in which no significant externalities are pres-
ent. 
The first regulatory category in the Code's non-local system em-
bodies those areas where development might affect citizens of more 
than just the locality in which a particular area is located. The Code 
terms these "Areas of Critical State Concern."13 Such areas can be 
identified in two principal sets of circumstances: first, when histori-
cal, natural or environmental resources "of regional or statewide 
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importance"14 are present; and second, when an area is "signifi-
cantly affected by, or has a significant effect upon, an existing or 
proposed major public facility or other area of major public invest-
ment."IS An example of the first set of circumstances would be a salt 
marsh used by migrating waterfowl; an example of the second would 
be land around a proposed major airport. lft 
The second category embodies those types of development which, 
wherever they occur, are likely to have an effect upon the citizens 
of more than one locality. The Code terms these "Development[s] 
of Regional Impact."17 Such developments may be those of large 
size, those which create substantial environmental problems, those 
which attract large numbers of persons or vehicles, or those which 
will generate additional development. IS Supra-local interests are 
potentially present in such cases, and the Code mandates applica-
tion of a complex cost/benefit analysis (weighing costs and benefits 
for the locality and the region) to proposals for any such develop-
ment.11 
These two regulatory categories are the foundation of Massachu-
setts' recently enacted Martha's Vineyard Land Use Law.20 This 
statute establishes a twenty-one-member regional commission. This 
body passes on all applications to construct developments of re-
gional impact, defined, in part, as "the types of development which, 
because of their magnitude or the magnitude of their effect on the 
surrounding environment, are likely to present development issues 
significant to more than one municipality of the island of Martha's 
Vineyard."21 The regional commission also designates "district[s] 
of critical planning concern," (similar to the Code's Areas of Critical 
State Concern) and oversees local regulation of these districts.22 
B. Is there a Role for Regional Organization in a System Based 
on the ALI Model Code? 
Having identified these two categories of land use decisions which 
call for a different system of regulations than the norm of relatively 
exclusive local control, the Model Code assigns responsibilities 
within such a system to the state and local levels. The omission 
of a significant role for regional governmental entities (other than 
decentralization of state level entities) is not an oversight. "This 
Code rejects the idea of creating another level of governmental 
agency between the state government and the local governments. "23 
The draftsmen's principal reason for this rejection seems to be a 
belief that areawide agencies are inherently weak and highly suscep-
tible to "horse trading" among the component localities. Thus these 
agencies cannot be entrusted with the mission of protecting the 
------------
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supra-local interests, whose inadequate consideration by localities 
is the very reason for establishing the new system.24 
This reasoning, however, is not an argument against any role for 
regional organizations per se, but only against a role for those organ-
izations incapable of discharging it. Indeed, the Model Code has 
been sharply criticized for ignoring the emergence of regional bodies 
which could be a key element of any new regulatory system. 25 There 
are at least three reasons why a substantial regional component 
should be built into a system based on the Model Code. 
First, as the Code itself recognizes, the land use decisions in ques-
tion have regional implications. It is frequently the effect of a partic-
ular locality's decisions upon surrounding localities that brings the 
new system into play. A recent analysis by the Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations reached similar conclusions, 
calling for a substantial regional or state role to curb the external 
effects of local zoning. 2ft 
Second, a unified areawide approach to interrelated development 
problems is desirable. Such a unified approach not only leads to 
planning coordination (as between land use and transportation 
planning, for example); it assigns responsibility for as many func-
tions as possible to a governmental entity that can balance 
competing interestsY 
A third reason is the continuing vitality of the regionalism move-
ment itself. Significant new functions are being assigned to the 
regional level,28 and new and evolving regional bodies are demon-
strating the organizational flexibility of middle-tier government. 29 
Whether for these or other reasons, the ALI-based proposals pend-
ing in Massachusetts, as well as the Martha's Vineyard Law, assign 
substantial functions to the regionallevel. 30 There is, however, disa-
greement as to the precise allocation of functions among levels of 
government. Clearly, a range of options is available.3! The following 
subsection represents one possible set of allocations, based on the 
present status and likely evolution of regional institutions within 
Massachusetts. 
C. A Suggested Allocation of Functions32 
1. Critical Areas 
Regulation .of critical areas involves five general stages: definition 
of critical areas; delineation of the methods of control which may 
be applied to them; identification of specific areas; the establish-
ment of particular controls for specific areas; and the application of 
these controls to individual development decisions. Responsibility 
for these stages should be allocated among levels of government in 
--------------------------------
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the following way. 
The definition of areas of critical concern is largely a matter for 
the state level. This determination is the fundamental policy deci-
sion as to what types of areas may present supra-local considera-
tions. Such a decision should be made by the state legislature in its 
capacity as representative of the entire body politic. The legislature 
might act by a detailed statute spelling out the different types of 
critical areas, or by a more general statute which would be imple-
mented by more detailed state agency regulation. The use of a state 
agency reflects the role of the state government as guardian of all 
interests. However, it may be desirable to allow regions to define 
additional critical areas, as long as their definitions are consistent 
with the underlying state legislation and are approved at the state 
level. 33 
The general delineation of permissible methods of control would 
be a task for the state legislature, analogous to the passage of a 
zoning enabling act. 34 
The identification of specific critical areas presents the most diffi-
cult issues. The author believes that this function should be as-
signed to regional agencies, provided that they are properly consti-
tuted. Because this is the most important step in the process, for 
any supra-local interests, it should not be left to the localities. At 
the same time, the system under analysis here is not "end state" 
masterplanning imposed from the top down. The regional level, if 
the relevant institution is constituted in a politically accountable 
manner, provides opportunities for the accommodation of local de-
sires as well as protection for supra-local interests.35 
There may be instances where state level designation of particular 
critical areas is necessary. For example, an impoverished region 
might wish to encourage substantial tourist development in a valua-
ble natural area, even at the risk of damaging the area. 36 
At the same, time that it designates a specific critical area, the 
regional agency should issue guidelines for the local government's 
regulation of that area, indicating what types of development 
should be allowed and what types should be restricted or prohibited. 
The Model Code and proposals based on it provide for such guide-
lines to be issued at this pointY These guidelines represent essen-
tiallya statement of what supra-local interests may be present, and 
what steps should be taken to protect them. 
After this point the local government's responsibility becomes 
paramount, with the promulgation of specific regula-
tions-analogous to a zoning ordinance or by-law-for the desig-
nated area. There is some room for local choice, since the designa-
tion is accompanied by guidelines, rather than mandatory regula-
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tions. Local control will be further enhanced by having the local 
government enforce the regulations for the designated critical area, 
just as it enforces its other land use controls.3s 
Under this allocation of functions the higher levels of government 
have identified a specific task for the local government to perform 
along generally indicated lines. The higher levels must also be avail-
able as checks in the event that the local level does not carry out 
its task. The regulations for a specific area must be reviewed for 
conformity with the guidelines. This would seem to be the responsi-
bility of the regional agency, since that agency made the basic pol-
icy choice which the guidelines reflect. It may also be desirable to 
provide for an administrative appeal from local decisions applying 
the regulations. 3D Consideration of such appeals would seem to call 
for a quasi-judicial body, and such an entity would seem best cre-
ated at the state level by gubernatorial appointment. 4o 
2. Developments of Regional Impact. 
Regulation of developments of regional impact involves three gen-
eral stages: definition of developments of regional impact; delinea-
tion of the methods of control to be applied to them; and application 
of the controls to individual development decisions. Responsibility 
for these stages should be allocated among levels of government in 
the following way. 
Definition of such developments is largely a matter for the state 
level, for the same reasons as in the case of critical areas, with some 
room for regional variation. A fifty unit motel may well be of greater 
regional impact in the Berkshires than in downtown Boston. 
Also a matter of state responsibility is the establishment of the 
tests to be applied to proposed developments of regional impact. 
The state not only identifies these proposals as different from or-
dinary development proposals; it mandates a special set of rules to 
be applied to them. These rules may require a set of environmental 
and related findings, like the Vermont "Act 250 Criteria, "41 or a 
cost/benefit analysis like that envisaged in the Model Code.42 A 
uniform set of rules across the state would be desirable since the goal 
is a balance between local desires and the protection of pther than 
local interests. Local values will still assert themselves in the man-
ner in which the rules are applied. 43 
There is widespread disagreement over which level of government 
should actually apply the rules for developments of regional impact 
to specific applications for permits to build such developments. 
Both the Model Code and the Florida statute provide for local deci-
sion on the application, subject to administrative review at the state 
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leve1.44 In Massachusetts, however, the Martha's Vineyard Law and 
most pending statewide proposals place this responsibility at the 
regional level. 45 The premise seems to be that local governments will 
not adequately consider the potential supra-local interests present 
in these development decisions even when they are directed to and 
are told how to do it.48 
Assigning this function to the local level is strongly preferable. To 
begin with, it is consistent with the general Massachusetts intergov-
ernmental approach of local regulatory power exercised under the 
overriding supervision of a higher level (generally the state).47 The 
Anti-Snob Zoning Law48 and the Wetlands Protective Law49 are 
relevant precedents in the land use field, and, indeed, served as 
precursors of the ALI Model Code.50 
A second reason is that supra-local interests can be considered at 
all stages of the process. The first two stages-definition of develop-
ments of regional impact and establishment of special rules for 
them-are state-level actions designed to identify the presence of 
supra-local interests and to mandate their consideration in specific 
ways. The regional entity should participate in the local permit 
decisions, acting as an advocate for the "regional perspective. "51 
The regional entity should also have standing to appeal any local 
decision to a quasi-judicial state body.52 Properly constructed and 
enforced, a system which makes local government "think region-
ally" should work. 
A third reason for local decisions in these cases is concern for the 
mechanics of the permit process. A system in which one level of 
government decides all the issues in one proceeding should save 
time and also be responsive to builders' desire for a "one-step" 
permit system. It may also avoid the "triggering" question which 
arises when a higher level applies the development of regional im-
pact procedures separately from the local government's application 
of its own requirements. At what point should the development of 
regional impact proceedings begin-before the local government 
acts at all, after the issuance of conditional local permits, or after 
all local approvals have been received?53 
As indicated, this assignment of functions would be consistent 
with the Model Code, which is at the basis of most Massachusetts 
proposals. 54 It is not primarily the allocation issue, however, which 
has prevented the development of a consensus on division ofrespon-
sibilities among the state, regional and local levels. The principal 
impediment has been the obvious inability of the proponents of land 
use reform to agree on what regional entities to use. 
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n. REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Existing Institutions. 
1. Counties 
Counties in Massachusetts are not as significant a level of govern-
ment as they are in other parts of the country.55 Essentially, they 
function as arms of the state government, discharging certain res-
ponsibilities over courts, the penal system, agriculture, registries of 
deeds, highways and miscellaneous services. 58 New functions have 
not, as a rule, been assigned to the counties. 57 Indeed, some func-
tions have been taken away from them.58 Additional governmental 
responsibilities at the regional level have generally been assigned 
either to the regional planning agencies or to newly created regional 
entities. 59 
Except perhaps in some rural areas,80 the county is not a viable 
unit of government in Massachusetts, and certainly not one to 
which significant responsibilities in land use should be assigned. 
County government is in disrepute, partly because of questionable 
political practices and partly because the structure, consisting of 
three elected County Commissioners, has provided neither 
accountability nor visibility.81 
Proposals for county change in Massachusetts have ranged from 
outright abolition to dramatic restructuring and reform.82 In some 
parts of the state, county government will probably wither away 
and be absorbed by other levels. In other parts of the state, how-
ever, it may join forces with the regional planning agencies to be-
come a true middle tier government.83 
2. Regional Planning Agencies 
The Regional Planning Agencies (RPA's) are well on the way to 
becoming the dominant regional institutions in Massachusetts. 
There are 12 such agencies, ranging in size from Franklin County 
with 60,000 people to the gigantic Metropolitan Area Planning 
Council (MAPC), which contains 101 communities and over 2 mil-
lion people.84 Some were established under a general enabling stat-
ute.85 Others were established by special laws, either varying the 
general statute slightly, or establishing a unique form of organiza-
tion for a particular region. The regional planning agencies are ex-
amples of confederal regional bodies. For purposes of intergovern-
mental analysis, they can be classified as generally similar to a 
Council of Governments (COG)." 
The norm established by Chapter 40B, the general enabling 
statute, is representation of each constituent municipality by a 
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member of its planning board. There are substantial variations, 
however, including joint appointment of one member by the local 
governing body and the planning board67, appointees of both the 
local governing body and the planning board68, and appointees of 
the local governing body only.69 The Metropolitan Area Planning 
Council includes 20 members appointed by the Governor, and 
twenty representatives of state agencies, public authorities and the 
city of Boston, as well as a representative of each constituent com-
munity.70 
In most RPA's, each constituent municipality has the same num-
ber of representatives and votes. However, the makeup of the Cen-
tral Massachusetts Regional Planning District Commission repre-
sents an attempt to correlate size with voting power.71 Every com-
munity is represented by one member chosen by the planning board 
from among its members. Each community over 8,000 is entitled to 
a second voting member, appointed by the local governing body, 
while each community over 15,000 is entitled to a third voting mem-
ber, appointed by the planning board. Each community over 50,000 
is entitled to a fourth voting member, appointed by the local govern-
ing body. Provision is also made for alternate and ex officio mem-
bers.72 
The statutory powers of the regional planning agencies are largely 
advisory. They are to make studies of the "resources, problems, 
possibilities and needs" of their districts, and are to prepare a "com-
prehensive plan of development" (or a "schematic study plan") 
which shall include "recommendations for the physical, social, gov-
ernmental or economic improvement of the district as in their opin-
ion will be in the best interest of the inhabitants of the district. "73 
This significant responsibility is somewhat diminished, however, by 
the admonition that "such plans and recommendations shall be 
advisory only. "74 
At times the regional planning agencies have bemoaned their ad-
visory status and their lack of "clout".75 On paper, at least, these 
agencies appear to conform to the Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations' lukewarm description of COG's as "essen-
tally a device for incremental local adaptation to changing needs 
.... [a] procedural effort at balancing local independence and 
areawide interdependence."76 In fact, under the aegis ofthe national 
government and with help from a favorable state administration, 
the RPA's have become a major force,17 
The federal government has helped finance the operations of the 
RPA's through grants-in-aid.78 It has also enhanced their import-
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ance to member communities through the "A-95" review process, 
which requires that a regional agency review and comment upon 
local applications for federal funds under a wide variety of pro-
grams.79 Most important, however, is the regional planning agen-
cies' role in federal grant programs which require planning on the 
regional level as a condition of state eligibility for funds. 80 
Transportation planning provides a good example of this develop-
ment. The RPA's function jointly with state transportation agencies 
to furnish the regional planning component required by federal 
law.8! During 1973, RPA's received approximately $500,000, under 
contracts from the state Department of Public Works, for the per-
formance of this function. 82 In addition, recent Massachusetts legis-
lation creating a statewide network of regional transportation au-
thorities indicates that the RPA's will probably be the planning 
arms of these entities.83 
Potentially even more important, for those participating, is the 
designation of regional planning agencies as the "single representa-
tive planning organizations" under section 208 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act.84 As of this writing, nine RPA's have been 
designated to perform this function. 85 The "208" planning agencies 
have major tasks to perform, including the identification of 
treatment works necessary to meet the anticipated needs of their 
areas, establishment of construction priorities, and development of 
a program to "regulate the location, modification and construction 
of any facilities within such area which may result in any discharge 
in such area. "88 
Taken together these developments amount to a dramatic 
strengthening of the role of the RPA's. Although their comprehen-
sive plans are not binding, their functional plans are shaping public 
and private decisions. Some Massachusetts RPA's may become 
"Umbrella Multi-Jurisdictional Organizations," that is, area-wide 
quasi-governments with substantial planning control over the oper-
ation of other governmental units.87 
In greater Boston, the Metropolitan Area Planning Council may 
become the foundation for a true regional government. A number 
of proposals along these lines have been advanced within the past 
year.88 The absorption of the preexisting RP A into the newly created 
Martha's Vineyard Commission may also be a step in this direc-
tion.89 At any rate, the present status and possible evolution of the 
RPA's is a major consideration in the development of any new sys-
tem of land use control in Massachusetts. 
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B. Regional Institutions with Land Use Responsibilities-the 
Proposed Options. 
The land use proposals under discussion in Massachusetts assign 
regional responsibilities to a wide variety of entities. The institu-
tional options proposed may be grouped into three categories. 
The first category takes the regional planning agencies-either in 
their present form or with some modifications-and assigns land use 
responsibilities to them. Thus House Bill 644 establishes a special 
procedure for "developments of regional impact," along the lines 
recommended above, and directs that the relevant RP A prepare and 
submit to the local government considering a permit application for 
such development "a report and recommendations on the regional 
impact of the proposed development."to The report covers a broad 
spectrum of factors, including the proposed development's effect on 
the environment and public facilities, and the extent to which 
"[t]he development will have a favorable or unfavorable impact on 
the health, safety and morals of the residents of affected municipali-
ties."9t Apparently drawing on the Florida system, the bill requires 
that the local government consider whether the proposal is consis-
tent with the regional agency's report.92 Legislative proposals of 
prior years have given more substantial regulatory authority to the 
regional planning agencies. 93 
A second category of proposals creates new regional entities, and 
assigns them substantial roles in land use control. These entities are 
separate from, but closely related to, existing regional bodies. Thus 
House Bill 3907 , the most frequently cited statewide bill, establishes 
twelve "Regional Resource Committees" with the same boundaries 
as the existing RPA's. Each Committee would consist of eleven 
members, "six to be chosen by the Regional Planning Commission 
"from among its own members, and five members to be appointed 
by the Governor."94 The Committees are to designate "areas of criti-
cal planning concern," and regulate proposals for "developments of 
regional impact."95 In other proposals the new entities are elective,98 
or a combination of elective and appointive.87 
A third category of proposals creates new, general purpose re-
gional governments, and includes land use responsibilities among 
their functions. The strongest interest in this approach appears to 
be focused on the greater Boston area.9S However, the proponents of 
one such proposal have indicated that it can be applicable in other 
metropolitan areas.99 
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C. Choosing Among the Options-3 Criteria. 
Presented with this bewildering array of options, legislators might 
well be tempted to conclude that no optimum solution is possible, 
and that the only wise course of action is to refer the matter to 
further "study." However, choices among the competing institu-
tional alternatives can, and should, be made now, and there are 
three criteria which should guide those choices. 
1. Regional institutions with land use responsibilities should be 
politically accountable. 
The regional functions recommended in this article carry with 
them substantial power over the way in which a given region will 
develop and the uses to which its land will be put. The designation 
of critical areas, along with the basic policy decisions about permis-
sible development (guidelines), and intervention in local regulatory 
. proceedings as advocate of the regional interest represent more than 
technical "planning" responsibilities. These activities represent 
planning with substantial power to implement the policies devel-
oped. An entity exercising such power should be responsible to the 
electorate in identifiable ways.lOO 
Direct election of those who exercise this power is one way of 
satisfying this criterionlol Appointment by an authority, such as the 
Governor, which is itself directly responsible to the electorate is 
another. l02 Appointment by municipal officials of local representa-
tives to a regional body does not satisfy this criterion, however. 
Responsibility even for individual appointments may be diffused 
under such an arrangement, and there is no single election at which 
the hypothetical regional constituency can express itself. 
At the same time, however, representation of local governmental 
units by members of these units may serve other values important 
to a regional organization. The support of the local governmental 
units may be important to the regional entity's on-going work, and 
may well have been a political prerequisite to its formation. 103 If the 
local representatives are themselves local officials, their expertise 
may be a valuable contribution. l04 
One acceptable solution may be the creation of mixed elective-
appointive bodies, an approach which has been hailed as the most 
promising form of regional entity.l05 Certainly in Massachusetts, the 
Martha's Vineyard Law provides a highly relevant precedent. Re-
gionalland use responsibilities are performed by a twenty-one mem-
ber commission, seventeen of whose members have voting power. 
Nine members are elected at an island-wide election, with each of 
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the six towns guaranteed a representative; six are representatives of 
the individual town governments; one is a county commissioner 
chosen by the commissioners; one is a member of the state Cabinet 
appointed by the Governor; and the four non-voting members are 
non-resident taxpayers appointed by the Governor. IOa 
The evolution of the Martha's Vineyard legislative proposal is 
particularly instructive in this respect. An early proposal circulated 
for comment provided for no elected members. The Commission 
would have been composed entirely of representatives of local and 
county governments and of gubernatorial appointees. l07 By the time 
former Governor Sargent filed the proposal in August of 1973, six 
elected members had been added in place of local government repre-
sentatives. los However, these "elected" members were to be chosen 
at the annual town meetings. When the Governor re-filed his pro-
posal in March of 1974, it provided for the Commission in its present 
form. 1011- The result is a politically accountable body, the first 
election of whose members was hotly contested. At the same time, 
the existing governments have a substantial voice in its operations, 
as does the state government. 
2. The regional responsibility for land use should not be assigned 
to a single purpose unit divorced from the performance of other 
regional functions. 
The land use policies which will be made at the regional level are 
closely related to other important planning and resource manage-
ment decisions carried out, at least in part, at the regional level. 
These include comprehensive planning, and functional planning 
activities such as transportation planning, water quality planning, 
and air quality planning. no 
These decisions should not be made in isolation from each other. 
Coordination is necessary at the technical level so that, for example, 
transportation planning does not call for development of an area 
where environmental planning is aimed at curbing development. 
Coordination is also necessary at the fundamental policy-making 
level. These decisions involve the consideration of competing inter-
ests, and should be made by a body responsible for balancing these 
interests. III 
3. Regional institutions with land use responsibilities must be con-
stituted in accordance with the requirements of the one person-one 
vote doctrine. 
The impact of the one person-one vote doctrine upon the future 
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of local governmental bodies, especially regional institutions, has 
frequently been analyzed. 112 Although there is little precedent avail-
able on the relevance of the doctrine to regional land use agencies, 113 
the likely development of such agencies may well direct the atten-
tion of courts to such organizational questions as well as to the 
inevitable challenges by landowners to the underlying regulatory 
techniques applied. 1I4 Furthermore, there is evidence of increasing 
court challenges of the makeup of existing areawide agencies. 1I5 
Analysis of recent judicial decisions suggests three guidelines which 
may be of assistance to policymakers in a state like Massachusetts, 
which is considering a substantial regionalization of land use res-
ponsibilities. 
The first guideline is that the one person-one vote rule does not 
apply to appointive land use regulatory bodies. This was the holding 
in People ex rel. Younger v. Dorado County,1I8 in which the Califor-
nia Supreme Court relied on Sailors v. Board of Education.117 In the 
latter case the United States Supreme Court upheld the Michigan 
system of establishing county boards of education. Validly elected 
local school boards each sent a delegate to a county meeting where 
the assembled delegates elected the county board. Every delegate 
had one vote, even though they represented local school boards of 
varying sizes. The Court held that this system was "basically 
appointive," and that a state could choose to appoint local officials 
of a "non-legislative" character whose duties are administrative 
rather than legislative "in the classical sense."IIS 
Analysis and application of the Sailors decision presents two main 
problems. First, it is frequently hard to distinguish between "ad-
ministrative" and "legislative" functions at the local governmental 
level. Critics have pointed out that this problem was present in the 
case of the county board at issue in Sailors,1I9 and the Court itself 
has moved away from the administrative-legislative distinction as 
a useful test.120 It is probably accurate to say that any local govern-
mental body (including regional land use entities), other than the 
local legislative body itself, can be validly constituted through the 
appointive process. 
The second, and more difficult, problem under Sailors is deter-
mining which bodies are elective and which are appointive. It has 
been argued that Sailors itself involved an indirect election system, 
and that the power of the larger communities' voters was invalidly 
diluted. 121 This argument is potentially present in every case where 
a confederal body is composed of constituent communities of differ-
ent sizes, each one of which has equal voting power in the body. This 
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argument prevailed in Bianchi v. Griffing. 122 There, each town in the 
county elected a town supervisor who also sat as his town's "dele-
gate" on the county board of supervisors. Although Sailors was in-
voked as justifying this system, the Second Circuit struck it down. 
"The mandate of the equal protection clause cannot be effectively 
circumscribed by a local legislative body with general governmental 
powers ... simply by labeling [its] members 'delegates.' "123 The 
test seems to be whether local voters in electing a particular local 
official are, at the same time, "electing" their community's repre-
sentative to the confederal body.124 If this is the case, then the one 
person-one vote rule applies to the higher level as well. 
The second guideline is that if regional entities performing the 
land use functions recommended in this article do contain elected 
members, those members must be elected in accordance with the 
requirements of the one person-one vote rule. 
When the one person-one vote rule was first applied to local gov-
ernment, the Supreme Court was urged to extend it to all local 
government units whose members were elected from districts, ir-
respective of the functions performed by any particular unit.l25 The 
Court, however, left open the question by suggesting that some 
elected bodies might be exempt. 126 The extent of any such exception 
seemed quite narrow after Hadley v. Junior College District. 127 How-
ever, in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage 
District128 the Court did find an exempt body, and, in the process, 
gave some vitality to the exception. The Court upheld a system of 
governance for California's water storage districts, which limited 
the franchise to landowners and gave each owner voting power in 
proportion to the value of land held. The Court applied a two-part 
test to determine whether an exemption was warranted: first, did 
the district have a "special limited purpose", with other than "nor-
mal governmental authority;" second, did its operations "dispro-
portionately affect different groups?" The Court found both tests 
satisfied. It stressed the fact that the districts did not provide "gen-
eral public services such as schools, housing, transportation, utili-
ties, roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a 
municipal body," and that its water storage and flood control activi-
ties were paid for by, and mainly of benefit to, landowners.129 
The Court never explained why it felt a need to draw a line, nor 
why the two-part test enunciated was the guidepost for determining 
on which side of the line a particular local unit should be placed. 
Perhaps the majority was simply applying traditional equal protec-
tion analysis in the determination of whether the California struc-
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ture was "not rationally based."130 The disproportionate effect of the 
districts' operations on different groups might be relevant to the 
question of whether to permit a differential in voting power of those 
groups. However, this is only the second half of the test. Why limit 
this inquiry to those situations where the unit does not "exercise 
what might be thought of as 'normal governmental' authority?" The 
answer may be a value judgment that all general purpose and simi-
lar units of governments have a sufficient impact upon the lives of 
citizens that those units must be constituted in accordance with the 
fundamental principles of democratic government enunciated in the 
reapportionment cases,131 even if a differential impact might be 
provable in particular cases. 132 
The test enunciated in Salyer will prove difficult to apply,l33 but 
it will almost certainly lead to other decisions holding local govern-
mental units exempt from the requirements of the one person-one 
vote rule. Both of these points are illustrated by the recent decision 
of the Second Circuit in EducationlInstruccion, Inc. u. Moore.134 In 
that case the court denied the validity of a challenge upon one 
person-one vote grounds to a Council of Governments in the Greater 
Hartford area. The COG in question has duties generally similar to 
those of Massachusetts RPA's. Thus it is charged with formulating 
non-binding comprehensive plans, and with rendering technical as-
sistance to member municipalities. The Council can also issue re-
ports on the compatibility between regional plans and proposed 
municipal plans.135 
The principal ground for finding the one person-one vote rule 
inapplicable, in both the District and the Circuit Court, was that 
the Council performed "essentially advisory and non-govern-
mental" functions. Both courts purported to rely on Salyer,l38 but 
neither court applied the two-part test enunciated in that opinion. 
Rather, the case seems to stand for the proposition that since 
advisory bodies do not exercise governmental power over anyone the 
requirements of democratic government do not apply to the manner 
in which they are constituted. 137 
The dissenting judge argued persuasively that the COG's powers 
should not be determined solely from its authorizing state statute. 
He pointed to the extensive role which the Council played in the 
planning and administration of federal grant-in-aid programs. l38 
The same analysis could be applied to Massachusetts RPA's and to 
Councils of Government throughout the country. Unquestionably, 
therefore, the EducationlInstruccion decision is a setback for those 
who have argued that such bodies, if elected, must be constituted 
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in accordance with the one person-one vote rule. 13B 
However, the author believes that the elected members of the 
regional entities contemplated in this article would be subject to the 
rule. The land use responsibilities of these entities, apart from oth-
ers which might be assigned to them, would be sufficient to bring 
the rule into play. First, under the recommended allocation of func-
tions, regional entities would have sufficient regulatory power and 
ability to implement their plans to take them out of the category of 
"advisory" units established by Education/lnstruccion. Second, the 
power to designate critical areas and to determine how they are to 
be regulated (including the power to issue regulations if the regional 
entity disapproves of proposed local regulations) is sufficiently simi-
lar to the "typical governmental powers" of municipalities140 that 
the first half of the Salyer test would not be met. Third, these land 
use activities affect many different groups, not just landowners. 
Indeed, it is the desire to ensure protection of all potentially affected 
interests that would lead to creation of any such regional entity. 
This conclusion may seem to be at variance with the oft-cited 
need to encourage flexibility in the structure of regional govern-
ments.141 However, the conflict is resolved by the third guide-
line-namely, that the one person-one vote rule permits a wide 
variety of representational structures, and that representation of 
constituent muncipalities can be provided even in the context of 
substantial population differentials. 
The formation of a regional entity with power involves the ceding 
of some powers presently exercised by local government units. These 
units may be more willing to cede that power, and the resultant 
working relationships between levels may be more harmonious, if 
the local units are assured representation as units on the regional 
entity.142 One of the major challenges confronting the designers of 
new areawide institutions has been the development of a govern-
mental structure which could combine a regional outlook with polit-
ical legitimacy in the eyes of the constituent municipalities. 143 The 
policymakers' dilemma has been to satisfy these considerations 
without coming "dangerously close to [the argument] rejected in 
Reynolds, that sparsely populated counties deserve representation 
without regard to population so that their views can be heard."144 
Dusch v. Davis l45 provides an indication of the most promising 
way out of this dilemma. That case involved the consolidation of a 
city and its neighboring county into one municipality consisting of 
seven boroughs. At issue was a representation system for the city 
council, known as the "Seven-Four plan." Four members were 
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elected at large, without regard to residence. The remaining seven 
were also elected at large, but with the provision that each of the 
seven boroughs must be represented. There was a substantial dis-
parity in size among the boroughs.148 The Court held that since all 
voters had an equal power of choice this residence requirement did 
not invalidate the system. 
The decision has been criticized. l47 It is true that, under this sys-
tem, citizens of the large boroughs may be forced to elect councilors 
they otherwise might not have. 148 However, the system is a reasona-
ble and workable attempt at encouraging the election of borough 
representatives with a citywide perspective, and is seen by most 
commentators as a promising solution to the metropolitan di-
lemma.149 
Although Dusch v. Davis may be the most helpful source of flexi-
bility, it is not the only one. The designers of regional institutions 
should also give some consideration to the substantial variations in 
size which may be permitted among the representative districts of 
an elected regional body with representation by districts. In Abate 
v. Mundt,150 the Supreme Court, over a vigorous dissent, permitted 
a variation of 11.9 percent in a system designed to ensure that each 
town would have at least one representative on a county legislative 
board,151 The Court seems to have moved toward permitting greater 
population disparity in representative districts at the local level 
than at the state level, just as a higher degree is permissible at ,the 
state legislative level than at the Congressional district level. 152 
Abate, however, has its obvious limitations. It would not, for exam-
ple, have permitted single district election of one member per mu-
nicipality to the Martha's Vineyard Commission without creating 
a substantially larger body,153 
D. Regional Institutions-Two Recommendations, 
The application of these criteria-accountability, integration 
with other functions, and constitutionality-suggests that substan-
tial changes should be made in many of the proposals currently 
under discussion in Massachusetts. For example, the Regional Re-
source Committees proposed in House Bill 3907 do not satisfy the 
criterion of accountability. Six of the eleven members would be 
appointed by the Regional Planning Agencies, bodies which are not 
themselves politically accountable. The Regional Resource Com-
mittees also appear to be single purpose bodies, although they 
would, presumably, work closely with the RPA's. 
On the other hand, the Franklin County Land Use Proposal seems 
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to satisfy both criteria. The need for accountability is met through 
the election of twenty-six of the twenty-nine members.154 Although 
the Commission created under this proposal would be, strictly 
speaking, a single purpose entity, the draft mandates a close rela-
tionship between it and the county regional planning agen.cy, and 
, provides that the County's plan will ultimately become the control-
ling factor in the Commission's regulatory operation.155 However, 
the allocation of one representative to each town in the county 
would seem to violate the constitutional requirements analyzed 
above. 156 
N one of the regional functions recommended in this article should 
be assigned to the RPA's in their current form. An exception might 
be made for intervention in local proceedings considering proposals 
for "developments of regional impact."157 Certainly the RPA would 
be a more suitable advocate of the "regional interest," and its views 
would be entitled to more weight, if the agency were constituted by 
a process reasonably geared to reflect that interest. However, even 
as presently constituted, the RPA's can contribute technical plan-
ning expertise to individual permit decisions by, for example, pre-
paring regional impact statements considering the potential impact 
of the development on the region.15s Furthermore, intervention in 
local proceedings might be a step toward the allocation of greater 
responsibilities to more broadly based entities. 158 
These criticisms, however, should not be taken as a dismissal of 
the proposals currently under discussion. Taken together, they show 
a high degree of concern for the problem of developing a new institu-
tional structure, and point to ways in which that development 
might come about. Building upon the excellent work that has been 
done,160 the author would like to suggest two possible structures. 
1. Accountable regional planning agencies with some elected 
members 
The approach here is not to assign regional land use functions to 
entities separate from the RPA's, but to integrate these functions 
with the existing responsibilities of the RP A's, and to reconstitute 
these bodies in a politically accountable way. The Martha's Vine-
yard Law is a relevant example of this approach. The statute abol-
ishes the existing RP A (the Dukes County Planning and Economic 
Development Commission), and transfers its functions to the newly 
created Martha's Vineyard Commission.161 This solution enhances 
the interrelationship between the planning functions already per-
formed by regional planning agencies and the newly created regional 
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land use functions. The structure of the Martha's Vineyard Com-
mission, combining elective and appointive members, would satisfy 
the other criteria of political accountability and constitutionality. 
This approach may well be replicable in other parts of the state. 
There are some indications that the RPA's themselves would sup-
port it. 182 Certainly this approach helps solve a dilemma which has 
been of great concern to planners: the conflict between their desire 
for more binding and authoritative planning and the need for gov-
ernmental policy to emanate from a body with governmentallegiti-
macy.18S 
Proposals for mixed elective-appointive bodies are under consid-
eration in the current session of the Legislature. 184 There is strong 
interest nationwide in the development of such bodies as the most 
promising form of regional entity}85 In Massachusetts, the current 
prominence of the land use issue may well provide the impetus 
needed to take this significant institutional step. 
2. New general purpose entities at the regional level 
In some areas of the state it may be possible to go even further, 
and to create viable, general purpose regional governments with 
substantial responsibilities for the performance of areawide func-
tions including land use. Since general purpose government is an 
ideal forum in which to resolve competing claims for resource alloca-
tion and in which to make overall policy ~hoices, 188 this may well be 
the optimum approach for satisfying the three criteria advanced in 
this article. There are two distinct ways in which this development 
may come about in Massachusetts: the establishment of a new re-
gional government for the greater Boston area, and the transforma-
tion of county government in some rural areas into a new form of 
regional entity. 
Three proposals for a new metropolitan entity in greater Boston 
are under serious discussion. 187 Two out of the three assign to the 
new entity land use functions similar to those discussed in this 
article. A major unresolved issue is the nature of the governing body. 
The author believes that a combination of elected members and 
state government appointees, such as that proposed by the Greater 
Boston Chamber of Commerce,188 is more responsive to the criterion 
of political accountability than a governing body composed of exist-
ing municipal officials. 18s Perhaps the uncertainty over how far to 
go in this direction stems from the fact that a clear choice has not 
been made between a general purpose metropolitan government and 
a supervisory entity without substantial operating responsibilities. 
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In other parts of the state, restructured counties might combine 
with the Regional Planning Agencies to form significant regional 
entities.17O Certainly, the regional land use functions suggested here 
should be part of the responsibilities of such entities.17l Once again, 
land use questions may help trigger the process. 
3. Boundaries 
The question of boundaries for new regional entities has not yet 
emerged as a matter of significant dispute in Massachusetts. All 
proposals for greater Boston build on the existing Metropolitan Area 
Planning Council, despite its large size. In the rest of the state 
problems may arise in attempts to combine counties and RPA's in 
those cases where their boundaries are not the same. There are some 
"logical" areas in which this is not a problem. Moreover, the whole-
sale reform of county government would probably involve a substan-
tial redrawing of boundaries in any event.172 The problem perhaps 
does not arise at all when the option chosen is that of developing 
the existing RPA into a more accountable entity. 
TIL THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM SYSTEM 
The land use debate in Massachusetts is frequently couched in 
terms of whether or not one favors the enactment of "state" legisla-
tion. A source of confusion is the fact that this word is used in 
several senses: legislation emanating from the state government; 
regulation at the state level; and regulation across the entire state. 
Thus one element of the debate is whether any system that is 
adopted should be imposed "statewide." But even this question is, 
in reality, two questions: first, should a system of supra-local land 
use control be adopted for the entire state; second, should that 
system be uniform in all parts of the state? 
A. Whole State Coverage. 
The premises behind the serious consideration of a new land use 
control system for Massachusetts suggest that any such system 
should cover the whole state. Supra-local concerns are potentially 
present in a wide variety of development decisions. It is true that 
some regions of the state may have more critical areas than others, 
or may be more drastically affected by developments of regional 
impact. The argument here, however, is that supra-local interests 
should be protected whenever they arise (recognizing that no system 
will do this perfectly), unless creation of the system to protect them 
is harmful to other values in such a way that its "costs" (either the 
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costs of setting it up or the costs of operating it) outweigh its "bene-
fits" in regions of the state where it is little used. Hopefully the 
system presented here does not entail substantial "costs;" that is, 
it can be designed and operated so that it is not destructive of local 
control, does not cripple economic activity, and does not create a 
new and otherwise unnecessary level of institutions. 
Certainly, the ALI Model Code seems to establish a whole-state 
system.173 This is also true of many of the states which have enacted 
new land use control systems in recent years. 174 However, a state 
might conclude that only certain portions of it "need" a non-local 
control system.nG Coastal Zone Management is the strongest exam-
ple of this approach. 
There is a substantial possibility that Massachusetts will reject 
the "whole state" approach, and will enact one or more non-local 
systems for different portions of the state. The 1974 enactment of a 
special system for Martha's Vineyard may be a precedent in this 
direction. The Vineyard legislation was presented, in part, as a 
"model" or "pilot" for the rest of the state,178 but it may be a model 
for a segmented system with some regions not included at all. 
There are two reasons why the state Legislature might take this 
approach. First, it might conclude that a particular region "needs" 
a special land use control system, for example in areas where signifi-
cant natural resources may be threatened by development pres-
sures.177 Enactment of a Coastal Zone Management system would 
also embody this approach. 
The second reason would be a conclusion that a particular area 
"wants" a special land use control system. For example, the Mar-
tha's Vineyard legislation was enacted only after a favorable vote in 
a non-binding island-wide referendum. A particular region's desire 
for such legislation might be deduced from the fact that state legis-
lators from the area filed legislation, or that a regional institution 
supported it. One technique which is likely to be used is the passage 
of a land use bill for a particular region, subject to a local acceptance 
by popular vote.178 
There are strong arguments on both sides of the issue. However, 
if the Legislature accepts the premises behind a non-local system 
in the first place, such a system ought to cover the whole state. In a 
sense, the system proposed here could be regarded as the necessary 
minimum to protect supra-local interests wherever they may arise. 
If needed, special protection for particular areas or types of develop-
ment could be added. 
Although the local option may seem like a natural compromise, 
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especially to legislators, it should be rejected. A principal function 
of the state legislature is to protect interests which the political 
process at lower levels may not protect.179 Once the Legislature con-
cludes that these interests are present-actually or potentially-in 
a region, it should not give that region the option of not protecting 
them. 
B. Statewide Uniformity 
Those "whole state" systems which do exist in the United States 
are uniform in the sense that the same set of institutions operate 
everywhere within the boundaries of each state. It should be noted, 
however, that in decentralized systems the various regional agencies 
may approach their duties somewhat differently}80 There is no rea-
son why a uniform structure is necessary. Different institutions in 
different parts of the same state may be employed to protect the 
same set of interests. The middle tier structure suitable for a large 
metropolitan area such as greater Boston may differ greatly from 
the institution which evolves in a large rural county such as Berk-
shire, which would, in turn, be different from the Martha's Vineyard 
Commission. 
The values inherent in local autonomy can be advanced by letting 
each region evolve, to some extent, as it "wishes." The ultimate 
state (and "statewide") legislation might even contain a series of 
"regional options." A "standard form" of middle tier institution 
could be established as the norm, with each region given the oppor-
tunity to devise its own variant and to adopt it in a regional referen-
dum. 1S1 The state would have to play some role in delineation of 
boundaries, in the first instance, and would have to retain some 
power of approval over any region's alternate choice. In particular 
cases, such as the creation of a metropolitan government for Boston, 
specific state legislation would be necessary. 
The value of regional differentiation can be advanced in another 
way: by varying the extent of regulatory activities performed at the 
regional level. Under the system proposed, the functions assigned to 
the local level remain constant: adoption of regulations for critical 
areas; enforcement of these regulations; and enforcement of the 
standards governing developments of regional impact. At the re-
gionallevel, however, assignment of functions might depend on the 
capability of the different regional institutions to perform them. All 
functions not assigned to the regional level would be performed at 
the state level. 
A significant feature of this system is that it can be set into 
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motion at once, and as various regional institutions evolve, new 
duties can be assigned to them. This might work as follows: Area 
"A" has not developed an appropriate regional structure. Critical 
areas are designated at the state level, with assistance from the 
existing RP A, and the state reviews proposed local regulations, and 
adopts· its own if these are inadequate. The RPA intervenes in local 
development of regional impact proceedings. Area "B" has devel-
oped an appropriate regional institution as outlined above. This 
regional agency performs the functions of designation and review of 
critical areas, which the regional agency in area "A" is not ready to 
undertake. An important effect of this approach will be to hasten 
the development of regionalism in area "A", since the alternative 
of state performance of the function will be seen as a lessening of 
"local control." 
IV. CONFORMITY WITH FEDERAL LAND USE LAws-A NOTE 
The strong possibility that Massachusetts will enact statewide 
land use legislation will be further enhanced by the passage of a 
National Land Use Policy Act. 182 Furthermore, Massachusetts is 
already participating in the Coastal Zone Management Act,183 and 
has thus committed itself to developing new land use controls for a 
substantial portion of its territory. Any statewide land use legisla-
tion should attempt to comply with the likely provisions of a na-
tional bill, and the system should be integrated with the Coastal 
Zone Management Plan. State legislation based on the ALI regula-
tory categories should satisfy the requirements of both federal pro-
grams, although the Coastal Zone Management Act appears to re-
quire more extensive regulation of uses than the national land use 
proposals. 184 
The institutional structure and allocation of responsibilities rec-
ommended in this article would also comply with the likely require-
ments of both programs. However, one caveat should be noted. The 
Martha's Vineyard Commission is an institutional model, but the 
absence of any appeal from its decisions to a state-level administra-
tive body may limit this statute's value as a procedural model. The 
"Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act" which passed the 
Senate in 1973 gives the states a choice, at the stage of implement-
ing an ALI-based land use program, between: 
(1) implementation by general purpose local governments pursuant to 
criteria and standards established by the State, such implementation 
to be subject to State administrative review with State authority to 
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disapprove such implementation whenever it fails to meet such criteria 
and guidelines; and (2) direct state land use planning and regulation. 18Il 
The first alternative would seem to require case by case review at 
the state level, as opposed to periodic reviews of compliance. The 
Martha's Vineyard Law does not provide for such review. Nor does 
that statute satisfy the second alternative. The new Commission is 
a regional body, (indeed, one which might comply with the Senate 
bill's definition of "general purpose local government"I88) rather 
than a state level entity. 
The institutional structure proposed in this article avoids this 
problem by providing for state-level administrative appeal, primar-
ily as an additional check to ensure the protection of all interests 
potentially present in critical areas and in developments of regional 
impact. The conformity of this approach with likely federallegisla-
tion is an additional reason for adopting it. 
CONCLUSION 
Massachusetts is still in what might be called the "process" stage. 
However, the process may be nearing its completion, and the enact-
ment of significant new land use legislation may become a reality. 
Such legislation will not come about until the institutional ques-
tions raised in this article are resolved. Yet these questions can be 
answered, and from the answers can come not only land use legisla-
tion, but also the new regional institutions which Massachusetts 
reformers have sought to bring about. 
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